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e ‘received view’ about computation is that all computations must involve representa-
tional content. Egan and Piccinini argue against the received view. In this paper, I focus
on Egan’s arguments, claiming that they fall short of establishing that computations
do not involve representational content. I provide positive arguments explaining why
computation has to involve representational content, and how the representational
content may be of any type (e.g. distal, broad, etc.). I also argue (contra Egan and
Fodor) that there is no need for computational psychology to be individualistic. Finally,
I draw out a number of consequences for computational individuation, proposing
necessary conditions on computational identity and necessary and sucient conditions
on computational I/O equivalence of physical systems.
1 Introduction
What makes a physical process a computation? What is the dierence between a com-
putation and any other process? Under what conditions are two computations the same
or dierent?ese are among the key questions that a philosophical theory of physical
computation should answer.e detailed shape of the answers is not yet clear. Yet there
seem to be certain features that any reasonable theory of computational implementation
should possess. What has been labelled ‘the received view’ is that computation must
involve representational content.1 According to this view, a necessary condition on any
physical process counting as a computation is that it possess representational content (and
that representational content may be of distal objects).e received view has come under
two inuential attacks, from Egan (1991, 1992, 1994, 1995) and Piccinini (2008). Egan
1. Philosophers with views as divergent as Churchland (1986); Crane (2003); Cummins (1989); Dennett
(1971); Fodor (1998); Pylyshyn (1984); Searle (1992) hold that computation must involve representational
content.
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argues that one should understand computation in purely mathematical terms, Piccinini
that one should understand computation mechanistically.2 In this paper, I focus on Egan’s
argument. I argue that Egan’s attack fails.e focus is on Egan, but there are points of
contact throughout with Piccinini’s argument and these will be noted in passing. A full
discussion of Piccinini’s sophisticated position has to wait until another occasion.
e purpose of this paper may appear overly negative: to show that Egan’s attack against
the received view fails. However, the argument is constructive in a number of ways. First, I
argue that a distinction should be made between the concept of computation employed by
mathematical computation theory and that used in the implementation of a computation
by a physical system. Second, I argue that even if one wishes to take mathematical compu-
tation theory as a model for other computation talk, appeal to representational content
is inescapable when attributing computations to physical systems.ird, I argue, contra
Egan and Fodor, that there is no conceptual link between computational psychology and
individualism.ere is no reason why a computational psychology should be individual-
istic, or if it were to involve representation, why it should only involve narrow content. In
other words, methodological solipsism is no part of the computational theory of mind.
Fourth, I sketch positive arguments for why computation has to involve representational
content.
e outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I consider three arguments against the
received view and showwhy they fail.e rst argument is not endorsed by Egan but it has
widespread currency in the philosophical literature, and is worth considering if only to get
it out of the way. Egan’s inuential arguments receive amore detailed treatment. Egan’s rst
argument is based on the interpretation of Marr’s theory of vision. Egan argues that Marr’s
theory—which is a paradigm of computational explanation—does not posit semantic
content. Hence, not all computational processes need involve representational content.
Egan’s second argument involves a dilemma concerning narrow content. She claims
that anyone who accepts computational psychology must accept either an unpleasant
commitment to narrow content, or drop the received view entirely. I argue that both
Egan’s ways of attacking the received view can be resisted. In Section 3, I turn to positive
arguments for the received view.is section is not intended as a full-edged defence of
the received view, but it does highlight what I take to be the key intuitions that should
underlie such a defence.e intention is to demonstrate that the received view is alive
and kicking.e claim that computation must involve representation, as a received view,
may appear apt for debunking, but in this case, the received view is simply true.
Before proceeding, a number of qualications should be mentioned.
First, the received view is the claim is that representation is essential to computation:
r Computation essentially involves representational content
Where no restriction is placed on the type of representational content involved, e.g. no
ban on distal objects serving as content. Egan and Piccinini accept that computations
oen do involve representational content, but they argue that such features are accidental
2. Cf. Bechtel and Richardson (1993); Craver (2007); Glennan (2002); Machamer, Darden and Craver
(2000).
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to a system’s computational nature, and have no bearing on its computational identity.
My claim is that such representational content is a necessary condition that does crucial
work in determining computational identity. It is worth emphasising that even on this
view, representation would still only be one condition on computational implementation:
there are further conditions that a physical computation should satisfy, and additional
properties that dierentiate physical computations. However, representation does much
of the hard work in answering the questions about individuation that motivate an account
of physical computation. Consequently, it is a feature of physical computation that should
be of special interest.
Second, discussion of the received view is oen phrased in terms of a consequence that
the view might have: that the computations involved in cognition essentially have their
intentional content.3 I wish to avoid phrasing the debate in terms of intentional content.
e question of whether computation is committed to intentional content introduces a
number of requirements that go beyond R, and one would not wish to pre-judge those
issues when considering R. For example, intentional contents plausibly require the involve-
ment of cognitive agents, but one would not wish to pre-judge whether computations can
take place without involvement of cognitive agents. Intentional contents have a mode
of presentation as well as an object or referent. But one would not wish to pre-judge
whether the representations involved in a physical computation must have a mode of
presentation as well as a referent. Intentional states play complex causal roles in our
psychology. But one would not wish to pre-judge whether the representations involved
in a physical computation must also play the same causal roles (e.g. whether they have
propositional structure, are accessible to consciousness, capable of driving our behaviour
in certain ways, and so on). ese are important questions, but they are posterior to
the question of whether physical computation involves representational content of any
kind at all. In what follows, I will phrase the debate in terms of representational content.
Roughly speaking, a representation need support nomore than a basic notion of aboutness
or reference. A representation should link an entity and a content, such that the entity
represents its content. Nothing more is required. In particular, it is not required that any
of the conditions above concerning intentional content are satised.
ird, the dispute over the received view is sometimes conducted in terms of the nature
and individuation of physical computational states. As I will argue in Section 2.3, questions
about individuation of physical computations should be phrased in terms of processes: the
basic units of physical computation are computational processes, and individuation of
physical computational states is parasitic on the individuation of computational processes.
is is more than just a matter of book-keeping. As argued in Section 2.3, excessive focus
on computational states has led to the unjustied assumption that physical computations
could only essentially involve narrow content.
Finally, in what follows, ‘computational process’, ‘physical computation’, and ‘computa-
tional system’ will be used interchangeably. What is meant is the implementation of a
computation by a physical system.
3. Burge (1986); Egan (1991, 1992, 1994, 1995); Fodor (1980); Segal (1989); Shagrir (2001).
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2 Arguments against the representation condition
is section presents three arguments against physical computation necessarily involving
representation.e rst argument has few explicit defenders, but it is worth considering
because it still has a signicant inuence in the philosophical literature.e other two
arguments are carefully developed by Egan and warrant more attention.
2.1 Distinction between dynamics and individuation
A seductive line of thought about physical computation appears to argue against the
received view. Computations are formal, their transitions are governed only by the
syntactic character or ‘shape’ of the computational tokens. A computational token’s shape
typically covaries with its semantic properties. But it is the shape that does the causal work
in the transitions, not the semantic properties. Indeed, computation is a way in which a
physical process can appear to be semantically sensitive without spookily depending on
what its tokens represent.erefore, semantic properties do no essential causal work in
the transitions of computational processes.e conclusion is that semantic properties
ride along with computations, but they are not among their essential properties.erefore,
representational content is not essential to computation.4
ree problems should be noted with this argument.
First, the argument mistakes the form of dependence on representational content at
issue in the received view. An advocate of R does not claim that the causal dynamics of
computations depend on representational content. Her claim is that the individuation
of computations depends on their representational content. e battleground for the
received view are the facts about the individuation of computations, not the facts about
their dynamics. If one cannotmake sense of computational identity, or a computation/non-
computation contrast, without reference to representational features, then representation
is an essential feature of computation, regardless of its claimed irrelevance to causal
dynamics. A non-semantic nature for computational transitions is compatible with the
claim that computation essentially involves representational content.
A second problem is that the argument relies on a questionable notion of ‘essential causal
work’. It is not obvious that if one property (or cluster of properties) ‘does the causal
work’ of another, then that latter property is causally irrelevant. As debates over Kim’s
exclusion argument illustrate, to assume such a principle is valid commits oneself to a
strong form of reductive materialism where the only causally relevant properties lie at
the bottom level of physics, if such a level exists. Unless one has no qualms about such
a reduction, the argument above that semantic properties of computations are causally
irrelevant because their work is done by syntactic properties should be regarded with
suspicion. Further justication is required to show that semantic properties are somehow
specially disreputable.
4. Cf. Searle (1990)’s ‘axiomatic argument’ against Strong AI: since computational operations are purely
formal, computations need not have semantic content. And Stich (1983)’s argument that the computa-
tional theory of mind supports eliminativism about intentional content because, if mental processes are
computations, their representational content is explanatorily irrelevant to their causal dynamics (p. 193).
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Finally, pace Kim’s argument, if one is willing to grant computational states causal powers
at all, there are positive reasons for thinking that connections exist between the facts about
individuation and the facts about causal dynamics. Facts about causal dynamics include,
inter alia, facts about which events are involved in the causal dynamics.e events that
exist, and whether those events include the tokening of computational states, depend
on facts about the individuation of computations. If one wishes to allow computational
states to have causal powers qua computational states, then appeal to their individuative
properties is required to account for the causal dynamics of the system. If those individu-
ative properties include their semantic properties, then their semantic properties will
essentially gure in the causal dynamics.erefore, although computational transitions
may not require any spooky dependence on semantic properties, that does not mean that
semantic properties are causally irrelevant in the overall causal dynamics of the system. If
computational states qua computational states have causal power, then facts about their
individuation cannot be separated from the facts about their causal dynamics.
2.2 Egan’s argument from interpretation of Marr
e debate over whether computation essentially involves representational content has
centred around the interpretation of Marr’s theory of vision.
Anumber of participants defend the view thatMarr’s theory of visionmakes essential use of
representational content.5 Egan (1995) argues that this is wrong. She claims that although
a complete explanation of visual processes will typically advert to representational content,
the computational core of such a theory is purely non-representational and mathematical.
Just as an explanation of the ability of a sand shark to detect its prey using electric elds
adverts to both electromagnetic theory and the fact that in the shark’s environment,
animals, but not rocks, produce signicant electric elds, without the latter environmental
fact being part of electromagnetic theory, so an explanation of vision will typically appeal to
representational features beyond purely formal computational properties, without those
representational features being part of the computational theory of vision.
What reason does Egan give for thinking that computational theories of vision are non-
representational and mathematical? She starts by drawing attention to Marr’s three levels
of computational description: (i) the computational level, which characterises the function
computed by the system; (ii) the algorithmic level, which species an algorithm for com-
puting that function; and (iii) the implementation level, which describes how the process
is physically realised. Marr’s computational level is sometimes thought to be intentional
and occasionally straightforwardly equated with Pylyshyn (1984)’s semantic level, Newell
(1982)’s knowledge level, or Dennett (1987)’s intentional level. Egan claims that this is a
mistake. To adopt Marr’s computational level is not to adopt any kind of intentional or
semantic description, but instead the point of view of mathematical computation theory
for describing the system. In the context of Marr’s theory, the computational level should
be understood in amathematical function-theoretic way of describing the system. Compu-
tational description is a characterisation of the functions computed by the various parts
5. e primary concern is to decide whether the representational content is wide or narrow. Burge
(1986); Davies (1991); Kitcher (1988); Shapiro (1997) defend broad content, and Cummins (1989); Morton
(1993); Segal (1989, 1991) defend narrow content.
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of the cognitive system in mathematical terms, not in terms of what those parts represent:
I have argued that from a computational point of view [the retina] signals∇2G∗I (the X channels) and its time derivative ∂/∂t(∇2G∗I) (the y channels).
From a computational point of view, this is a precise characterization of what
the retina does. Of course, it does a lot more—it transduces the light, allows
for a huge dynamic range, has a fovea with interesting characteristics, can be
moved around, and so forth. What you accept as a reasonable description of
what the retina does depends on your point of view. I personally accept ∇2G
as an adequate description, although I take an unashamedly information-
processing point of view. (Marr 1982, p. 337)
At the computational level, the retina computes ∇2G. ∇2G is a mathematical function
that maps two-dimensional arrays I(x , y) to isotropic rates of rates of change of I(x , y)
at points (x , y) via convolution. A computational description of the visual system is a
purely formal mathematical description of the function computed by the system. It is
not a description of the visual system in terms of, say, representations of light intensity
values or shape. It is neutral about whether the inputs and outputs to the system have any
representational content at all.
Egan argues that if Marr’s computational level need not involve representational content,
then his algorithmic level need not involve representational content either. erefore,
the computational core of Marr’s theory makes no use of representational content: it
is a purely mathematical construction. Egan acknowledges that Marr thinks that the
visual system has other properties—and to the list above she would presumably add
representational properties—but those properties are not essential to the computation
that the system performs. Hence, a paradigmatic case of a computation performed by
a physical system—the computation Marr attributes to the human retina—does not
essentially involve representational content.erefore, R is false.
What can be said in response?
First, a distinction should be drawn betweenmathematical computation theory andMarr’s
computational level. Mathematical computation theory is a branch of pure mathematics
and concerns relations between mathematical structures and objects. e ‘computers’
it studies are mathematical entities, not physical systems. According to mathematical
computation theory, a Turing machine is not a physical system; it does not ‘perform’ a
computation in the sense that a physical system does. A Turing machine is typically identi-
ed with a set of set of mathematical symbols, e.g. with the quintupleM = (Q , Σ, Γ, δ, q0),
where Q is a set of state symbols, Γ is a set of numerals that can be used on the tape, B a
special symbol that represents a blank, Σ a subset of Γ − {B} called the input alphabet, δ
is a partial function from Q × Γ ↦ Q × Γ × {L, R} labelled the transition table, q0 ∈ Q a
special state called the start state, and the symbols L, R the direction of movement along
the tape.e Turing machine’s tape is another mathematical entity in which symbols are
kept in a linear order.6 One can make sense of a Turing machine having ‘inputs’: the initial
symbols on the tape. One can make sense of a Turing machine having ‘outputs’: the nal
6. See Sudkamp (1998), pp. 259–260 for more on the denition of a Turing machine.
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symbols on the tape. But in each case the inputs and outputs are mathematical objects,
typically, ordered sequences of numerals. It should be emphasised that these inputs and
outputs are not empirical ink-marks.ey aremathematical entities, numerals understood
as abstract objects. Typically, one does not care what these abstract entities are, so long
as one can make sense of them being numerically distinct. e computations studied
in mathematical computation theory are independent of how things are in the physical
world.ey are independent of empirical ink-marks, they do not ‘take place’ in time, or
depend on the physical possibility of innitely long tapes. Computers in mathematical
computation theory are mathematical entities that bear certain relations, studied by that
theory, to other mathematical entities, the functions they compute.
Likewise, Euclidean geometry, by itself, says nothing about the structure of the physical
world. Of course, thinking about physical triangles, lines, and planes oen has a heuristic
and propaedeutic value when thinking about Euclidean geometry. Similarly, thinking
about physical paper-tape machines oen has a heuristic and propaedeutic value when
studying mathematical computation theory. Secondly, a signicant motivation for study-
ing these areas of pure mathematics, and the reason why they are classied as distinctively
‘computational’ or ‘geometrical’ is their potential application to physical systems. However,
it should be clear that physical entities are not the subject matter of the relevant mathem-
atical claims. Mathematical computation theory does not say anything about physical
systems.
Consequently, mathematical computation theory does not, by itself, have the resources
to explain how the visual system works. erefore, Marr’s computational level cannot
straightforwardly be identied with the function-theoretic descriptions given in mathem-
atical computation theory. Marr needs some way of connecting the abstract mathematical
descriptions to the nuts and bolts of physical reality.7 How do mathematical entities, like
I(x , y) and (x , y), get connected to the human visual system? One possible answer is the
realization function:
. . . a realization function fR . . . maps equivalence classes of physical features of
a system to what we might call “symbolic” features. Formal [computational]
operations are just those physical operations that are dierentially sensitive
to the aspects of symbolic expressions that under the realization function fR
are specied as formal features. e mapping fR allows a causal sequence
of physical state transitions to be interpreted as a computation . . . Given
this method of individuating computational states, two systems performing
the same operations over the same symbol structures are computationally
indistinguishable. (Egan 1992, p. 446)
A realization function maps physical nuts and bolts to the formal symbols employed by
computation theory. It is the link between the abstract world ofmathematical computation
and the empirical world of the human visual system. At least according to Egan’s earlier
7. Note that this is dierent from the question that Egan (1995) considers on pp. 189–194: how a formal
computational account of the visual system can connect to explaining the intentional capacities of the
subject.e question here is how a formal computational description can even be about the human visual
system.
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work, a realization function does the bulk of the work of computational individuation;
it determines whether a physical system performs a computation, and if so, which com-
putation it performs.8 If a realization function obtains between a physical system and
the abstract entities involved in a mathematical computation, such that transitions in the
physical system mirror those of the symbolic entities in the mathematical computation,
then that physical system implements that computation. A realization function is to be
understood non-semantically: it associates physical states with mathematical entities
independently of any representational content that those physical states might have. A
realization function is no more than a mapping (a pairing) between classes of physical
features and abstract entities.
Egan (this volume) claries the role of the realization function: physical computational
identity depends both on a realization function and a special kind of semantic interpret-
ation that assigns exclusively mathematical content to physical states. Appeal to distal
environmental content is banned in establishing computational identity. To the extent
that Egan asserts that the relationship between physical states and mathematical entities
has to be one of representation, I agree. I argue against her ban on distal representational
content in Section 2.3. However, it is worth considering, as initially appeared to be in
the ong, whether one can have computational implementation only with a realization
function, i.e. without a commitment to representational content of any kind.
One problem that a non-semantic view faces is the threat of universal realization. A
realization function is a mapping between a mathematical computation and a physical
system, and such mappings are cheap. ere are billions of particles in a brick wall
undergoing complex patterns of activity (gravitational, thermal, electromagnetic, etc.).
Searle (1992) claims that there are so many physical patterns inside a brick wall that
there is almost certain to be at least one pattern that maps onto the structure of any
nite mathematical computation one likes. Putnam (1988) shows that one does not
need a complex system like a brick wall to have universal realization on this view of
computational implementation. By just considering the state of a single particle as it
evolves over time one can construct a realization function that makes that particle perform
any nite computation one likes. Chalmers (1996) argues that, with some qualications,
the transitions involved can also support counterfactuals.9 If the mere existence of a
realization function is sucient for a physical system to perform a computation, then
almost every physical system performs every computation.
If Egan’s realization functions determine computational identity, then the computational
identity of physical systems would be trivial. In order to avoid this, some extra constraints
are required. Not every realization function should establish a computational identity.
8. ‘. . . the fact remains that the realization function fR determines how the computational states are
individuated.is function individuates computational states non-semantically, that is, independently
of any particular semantic interpretation such states may have . . . while the semantic interpretation does
provide a useful description of what the system does, it does not serve to individuate the underlying
computational states.’ (Egan 1992, p. 448); ‘While the interpretation function FI plays an important
explanatory role in a computational theory, it does not, however, play an individuative role.at is the job
of FR [the realization function].’ (Egan 1994, p. 261).
9. Putnam (1988)’s argument is made in terms of nite state automata but can be applied to other
computational formalisms. Chalmers (1996)’s argument requires that a physical system possess a ‘clock’
and a ‘dial’, but these conditions are easily satised.
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But what makes certain realization functions special? Why does the existence of some,
but not other, realization functions suce to establish a physical computation?
Two tempting answers should be avoided.10 First, it cannot be that some realization
functions do not establish a physical computation because they are somehow insuciently
‘direct’ or ‘too disjunctive’.ere are plenty of disjunctive realization functions that do
establish physical computations. ink of the kinds of realization functions involved
in electronic PCs. ere is nothing direct or natural about mapping the voltage levels
5±0.4V in a 01100001 pattern in certain capacitors scattered throughout a machine to the
symbol ‘a’. Such a mapping is not perspicuous independent of familiarity with its practice,
nor does it cut the world at natural joints. Yet it is the realization function employed every
day in electronic computers. Unless one denies that those systems perform computations,
one cannot rule out a realization function because it is non-natural or too disjunctive.
Second, the reason why some realization functions are objectionable cannot be that it
requires excessive epistemic work on the part of the agent to construct those realization
functions.11 First, as noted above, the realization functions of electronic PCs oen require
considerable epistemic work on the part of a cognitive agent to construct. Sometimes the
cognitive agent (the hardware designer) has to perform the computation herself in advance
in order to construct the relevant realization function. Second, this response makes the
computation a physical system performs entirely a function of the epistemic powers
and interests of cognitive agents. It entails a form of anti-realism about computation:
the facts about computation are not constrained by the system itself (which trivially
perform every computation), but only by the facts about epistemic agents investigating
that system. Unless onewishes to endorse a strong form of anti-realism about computation,
questions about how a realization function is found or constructed should not matter
when establishing computational identity. What matters is why the existence of certain
realization functions, independent of how we discover them, is sucient to establish
computational identity.
One might attempt to avoid the threat of universal realization by claiming that Marr did
not say that the visual system performs a particular computation simpliciter, but only
that it performs a particular computation under a particular realization function, FR.is
would block the worry that Marr’s claims would be trivially true. However, it would go
beyond appeal to the mere existence of a realization function to explain howMarr’s theory
relates to the visual system. It would be to say that not only does that realization function
exist, but that it is also somehow special, or particularly relevant, to explaining the human
visual system. But in what does the relevance of that particular realization function lie?
Why is the computation that the retina performs∇2G, and not something else (as it would
be under any of the other realization functions that are satised by the human retina)?
is is not a question that a realization-based account of computational identity has the
resources to answer.
However, a natural answer to this question lies at hand. What makes a particular pairing
10. Variations on these answers are explored and endorsed in Cummins (1989), Ch. 8 in the context of
ruling out unintended interpretation functions. See also the discussion in Egan (1992), pp. 450–451; Egan
(1995), pp. 192–193.
11. Cummins (1989) appears to endorse this as part of his condition on an interpretation function
(pp. 102–105).
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between the nuts and bolts of an empirical system andmathematical entities (e.g. numerals
or numbers) special is that those nuts and bolts represent those entities. Certain realization
functions are special because they truly describe representation relations in the world.
e retina performs the computation that Marr suggests because its inputs and outputs
represent the relevant mathematical structures. Representation is the crucial link between
the mathematical and empirical world. It draws the line between relevant and irrelevant
realization functions and winnows down the innity of pairings in the only way that
respects the exibility of implementation of computation.
As noted above, Egan (this volume) now emphasises that certain mappings between phys-
ical structures and mathematical structures are special because the relevant physical states
represent mathematical entities. Egan claims that this representation relation, called the
canonical description or interpretation function, fI , together with the non-semantic realiza-
tion function, jointly determine computational identity. A puzzle remains on this view.
Once the representational fI is admitted, it is unclear what role is le for the non-semantic
realization function fR to play. If two physical systems map, via their interpretation func-
tions, onto the same abstract mathematical computation, then that seems both necessary
and sucient for those two systems to perform that computation. Similarly, if their inter-
pretation functions map two physical systems onto dierent mathematical computations
that appears both necessary and sucient for them to perform dierent computations. All
the work in establishing computational identity is done by the representational mapping,
fI , with nothing le over for fR to do. Eectively, the relationship between the nuts and
bolts and mathematical entities that fR purports to describe as special, if sense can be
made of it that is non-trivial, appears to be already entirely xed by the representation
relations described by fI .
2.3 Egan’s dilemma concerning narrow content
Egan’s second argument against R involves an ingenious dilemma concerning narrow
content.12 Egan argues that the nature of physical computation forces advocates of com-
putational psychology into a dilemma. Either they can hold onto the received view but be
committed to all cognitive computations involving narrow content (as Cummins (1989);
Fodor (1980); Segal (1989) do), or they could give up the received view entirely. Egan
argues that we should choose the latter option, for two reasons. First, it is notoriously
dicult to make sense of a notion of narrow content. Second, it is hard to see how, even if
a notion of narrow content could be constructed, it would live up to its billing as a form of
representational content that is relevant to psychology, where content is typically specied
in broad, environment-specic, terms. Computational theories like Marr’s oen ascribe
broad content to their processes (surface orientation, depth, etc.), not narrow content.13
Egan’s argument is based on the assumption that the only kind of representational content
that computations could essentially involve is narrow content. Since narrow content is
12. Narrow content supervenes on the intrinsic physical state of the agent, i.e. content that any intrinsic
physical duplicate would share irrespective of its external environment. Broad content fails to satisfy this
condition.
13. Egan (1995), pp. 194–195.
10
2 Arguments against the representation condition
either unavailable, or a bad t with the practice of computational psychology, we should
reject R. In short, the cost of R is an unacceptable commitment to narrow content.
Egan’s argument works only if:
n1 e only kind of representational content that computations could essentially in-
volve is narrow content
n2 A restriction to ascription of narrow content is intolerable in computational psy-
chology
I will argue against N1: there is no reason why physical computations in psychology, or
elsewhere, cannot essentially involve broad content. Cummins (1989); Fodor (1980, 1987);
Segal (1989, 1991) have argued against N2 and for the workability of narrow content in
computational psychology. I believe that we do not face such a dilemma. ere is no
reason why representational content in computational psychology cannot be either broad
or narrow.14
What is Egan’s argument for N1?
Egan claims that unless computational individuation is narrow, some important scientic
generalisations are lost. According to Egan, a computational description is a description of
amechanismwithout reference to its environment.e environment-independence of this
description allows us to make sense of a mechanism being well or ill adapted to various
environments. On the other hand, if computational descriptions were environment-
dependent, then the same computational mechanism could not be freely considered in
dierent environments. One could not make sense of apparently legitimate scientic
questions about the same mechanism being well or ill adapted in other environments.
It is precisely because a computational theory provides an environment-
independent characterization of a device that we can see why thismechanism
would not have been adaptive if the environment had been dierent, and why
it might cease to be adaptive if the environment changes.
(Egan 1994, p. 264)15
For example, consider a subject for whomMarr’s theory provides a correct account of her
visual processes. Suppose that this individual were transported to an environment where
her perceptual states have a dierent content. If computational identity essentially depends
on broad content, then the computational identity of her visual processes would dier.
Suppose in our environment, the computation that the subject performs is successful at
14. Wilson (1994) argues that the vehicles of computations in psychology can extend outside an indi-
vidual’s head and include objects in his or her environment (cf. Clark and Chalmers (1998)).is claim
should be distinguished from N1, which concerns the content of the representations involved in computa-
tions. As noted by Segal (1997), Wilson’s anti-individualism about vehicles is compatible with N1 about
content. Wilson’s view only introduces dependence on objects in the subject’s nearby environment. Broad
content can introduce dependence on environmental objects that are spatially and temporally distant (e.g.
originally-dubbed water samples).
15. Also Egan (1991), pp. 199–202; Egan (1992), p. 447.
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recovering visual information from the environment. It seems coherent to ask whether,
in the other environment, the same computation would be successful at recovering visual
information. But if broad content determines computational identity, then this latter
question cannot be asked. In the other environment, the computation would simply not
occur; the computational identity of the visual systemwould be dierent.16is appears to
render incoherent apparently legitimate questions about whether the same computational
system is well or ill adapted in dierent environments.
What can be said in response?
Talk of adaptation can be recovered using broad content with a combination of two
strategies.
First, even if the computational nature of a device changes across dierent environments,
one can still make sense of the same physical device being well or ill adapted to an environ-
ment. One can interpret talk of whether the human visual system is well or ill adapted to
an environment as talk of whether the physical system associated with the human visual
system is well or ill adapted to that environment. If the physical system associated with
the human visual system in the actual world performs poorly at recovering information
in a dierent environment, then the computation performed by the human visual system
is poorly adapted to that dierent environment. If the physical system performs well at
recovering information from the dierent environment, then the computation performed
by the human visual system is well adapted to that environment. Either claim can be true,
and explanatory, even if the computation performed in the new environment is dierent
from that performed in the actual world. On this strategy, claims about adaptation of
computational mechanisms are understood as claims about adaptation of the physical
system implementing the computation in the actual world.
A second strategy is that, when considering a counterfactual scenario, one may stipulate
representational content as part of the supposition. A physical duplicate might, in virtue
of being in another environment, have a dierent representational content and so a
dierent computational identity. However, that does not stop us from using that physical
duplicate to perform the same computation as in the actual world by setting up appropriate
representational conventions. Representational conventions are easy to set up: they can
be created by stipulation. ere is no reason why a physical system cannot have more
than one kind of representational content associated with it. It may have broad content,
acquired in virtue of its relation to its environment, and stipulated content, acquired in
virtue of the suppositions under which we consider the scenario. Claims about how a
computation in the actual world performs in a dierent environment can be understood
as claims about the performance of a physical duplicate in that dierent environment
where the system is interpreted so as to perform that same computation (i.e. where we adopt
appropriate representational conventions as part of our counterfactual imagining). In
other words, the question we entertain when considering adaptation under this strategy
is: supposing that a physical duplicate were to perform that same computation in the
counterfactual environment, how successful would it be in that environment?
16. is is not because the visual system could receive dierent input in the other environment—a
dierence in input does not amount to a dierence in a system’s computational identity.e worry is that
the computational mechanism that operates on inputs would dier in the dierent environment.
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When thinking about the degree of adaptation of a computational mechanism in dierent
environments, we may ip between either strategy. Sometimes we acknowledge that in a
dierent environment the physical system performs a dierent computation in virtue of
having dierent representational content (strategy 1). Sometimes we consider the physical
system in such as way as to force it to perform the same computation regardless of its
environment (strategy 2).
e cases discussed by Burge (1986) highlight the divergent nature of our judgements
about computational identity across dierent environments. Burge describes the human
visual system as performing an adaptive crack-processing computation in a crack-based
environment, and a physical duplicate of the organism as performing an adaptive shadow-
processing computation in another shadow-based environment.17e physical duplicates
have dierent broad contents, and therefore on Burge’s view, perform dierent computa-
tions.e former embodies assumptions about cracks.e latter embodies assumptions
about shadows. However, we can make sense of two, apparently competing, judgements
about adaptation of the human visual system in the two environments. On the one hand,
we can make sense of the judgement that the computation performed by the human visual
system is adaptive in both environments. Under strategy 1, one can see that the same
physical system is successful in both environments.e computation performed by the
physical system is adaptive in each case, even if the computations performed in each
case are dierent. On the other hand, one can make sense of the judgement that each
computation is adaptive only in its own environment. Under strategy 2, one can see each
system as performing the same computation across both environments by representa-
tional stipulation. By stipulating that the states in the second system represent cracks, we
can see that the rst, crack-based, computation is poor at detecting cracks in the second
environment: it would embody false assumptions about cracks. And one can see that the
second, shadow-based, computation is poor at detecting shadows in the rst environment:
it would embody false assumptions about shadows.
Switching our attention between the computation determined by broad content and
the computation determined by representational stipulation is part and parcel of our
thinking about computation across dierent environments.e combination of the two
strategies allows one to accommodate the competing judgements that in one sense (made
clear by strategy 1), the computation performed by the visual system is adaptive in both
environments, and in another sense (made clear by strategy 2), the computation performed
in each environment is adaptive only in its own environment. Both claims are compelling,
and understood right, are correct.e two-pronged described strategy above is able to
make sense of our judgements about adaptation better than a simple restriction to narrow
content. Its availability also shows that one is not forced to adopt N1 in order to make
sense of claims about adaptation.
A second inuential argument for N1 derives from Fodor (1980). It involves what Fodor
calls the formality condition. According to Fodor there is something about the nature
of physical computation that restricts computations to narrow content. Fodor’s exact
argument is hard to pin down. I will try to develop it below.
e motivation for the formality condition is to make sense of the ability of physical
17. Burge (1986), pp. 39–43.
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computations to appear to be semantically sensitive without spookily having access to
what their states refer to. Computations are formal: their transitions are governed by the
syntactic character or ‘shape’ of their states. A computation can give the appearance of
being semantically sensitive if the formal character of its states covaries with its representa-
tional content. By tracking formal properties, a computation can appear to track semantic
properties.is use of syntactic properties as proxies for semantic properties motivates
Fodor’s ‘formality condition’ on computation.e formality condition is that any physical
computation that appears to be semantically sensitive should have all relevant semantic
distinctions mirrored in formal dierences among its states:
the computational theory of mind requires that two thoughts can be distinct
in content only if they can be identied with relations to formally distinct
representations. (Fodor 1980, p. 486)
Broad content dramatically fails to satisfy this condition. States in two physically identical
individuals can be formally type-identical—they can be intrinsic duplicates—and yet have
dierent broad contents. Narrow content appears to be the only way of satisfying the
formality condition:
Narrow psychological states are those individuated in light of the formality
condition; viz., without reference to such semantic properties as truth and
reference. And honoring the formality condition is part and parcel of [com-
putational psychology]. (p. 495)
Broad content appears to reintroduce the spooky kind of dependence on content that the
notion of computation was intended to eliminate. Suppose one chooses to individuate
computational states in terms of their broad content. At the very least, a physical com-
putation should be consistent in how it handles its representational content: it should
consistently map the same representational content to the same representational content.
(If a physical computation is not consistent in this, then it makes no sense to individuate
physical computations in terms of how they handle their representational content). But
how can a computation consistently process broad content without being spookily sensit-
ive to its referent? How can it know that some tokens refer to water and others refer to
twater when those tokens are physically identical?e only type of content that physical
computations can consistently process—and hence the only kind of content relevant to
the individuation of physical computations—appears to be narrow content.
What can be said in response?
First, it is worth observing that the basic units of physical computation are processes,
not states. A physical state counts as computational only to the extent that it participates
in a physical computational process. It makes no sense to posit a computational state
in isolation from any computational process. Physical computational states must have
‘owners’, computational processes of which they are a part (just as digestion states must
have owners, processes of which they are a part). Furthermore, physical computational
states are not individuated in isolation.ey are individuated by reference to the physical
computational process in which they occur. A 5V signal in one process may play the role
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of a halting state, and 0V the role of a starting state, while a physically identical 5 V signal
in another process may play the role of a starting state, and 0V the role of a halting state.
One cannot identify a state as starting or halting without reference to the process in which
it occurs.
e motivation for the formality condition is to make sense of the apparent semantic
sensitivity of computations. However, what is required to account for this is that the
relevant semantic distinctions between a process’s states should be mirrored in formal
dierences among those states. It is not also required that all semantic properties, or
semantic dierences between the states of that computational process and those of any
other computational processes, should be so marked. Only the semantic dierences to
which a computational process appears to be sensitive need be formally encoded by its
states.
For example, suppose a computation appears to distinguish input tokens in English that
represent re from those that represent water. If presented with an input token that
represents re, the computation outputs the string of characters ‘re’, and if presented with
an input token that represents water, it outputs the string ‘water’. Such a computation is a
simple example of apparent semantic sensitivity. How could such a computation work?
Unless it is spookily sensitive to its referents, it works by the relevant semantic dierences
between its tokens being mirrored in formal dierences.e input tokens must have some
formal dierence that distinguishes tokens that represent re from those that represent
water.e tokens need not encode any other dierences than those required to explain
the behaviour above. For example, it is not necessary that a formal dierence between
tokens that represent re and chalk be marked to explain the semantic sensitivity above.
e formal structure of the tokens need only encode the information that re and water
tokens are relevantly dierent tokens. It need not encode all their semantic properties.
In particular, it need not be sucient to x their referents: it need not be sucient to
determine that re tokens refer to re, and that water tokens refer to water, and rule out
that the respective tokens refer to, say, 0 and 1, or chalk and cheese, or any other pair of
distinct contents.
ere is no reason, at least none stemming from explanation of apparent semantic sens-
itivity, to think that the formal structure of a computational state should determine its
representational content.erefore, there is no reason why its representational content
should supervene on its formal properties.e formal structure is only needed for the
computation to keep track of the semantic dierences relevant to the process, not to
encode all semantic properties. Consequently, there is no reason why the contents of
computational tokens cannot be broad. So long as a dierence between the re and water
tokens is marked, it does not matter whether their respective content is broad or narrow.
One might object that broad content is still dicult to process. If computations are
individuated in terms of their representational content, then a computation should be
consistent in how it processes its representational content: it should consistently map
the same representational content to the same representational content. Broad content
appears to interfere with this condition. Two computational tokens may have dierent
broad content and yet be physically identical. Such tokens would appear apt to disrupt
the consistent handling of representational content. What is to stop a computation that
ostensibly produces a consistent water–water mapping from, on any given occasion, pro-
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ducing a spurious water–twater mapping, or any other water–X mapping, where X is
physically identical to a water token but with dierent broad content? e computa-
tion cannot distinguish between water, twater, and X tokens, so there seems no way in
which it can consistently respond to, and yield, all and only water tokens. Any water
processing computation appears vulnerable to being hijacked by doppelgangers with
dierent broad content. erefore, computations over broad content cannot establish
consistent processing relationships between representations, and hence cannot establish
consistent computational identity.
However, the worry is unfounded. Cases of broad content involve some form of envir-
onment dependency. Two physically identical tokens can have dierent content (water
and twater) because they exist in dierent environments. Within a single environment,
broad content is the same (e.g. every token ‘water’ refers to water).e worry raised above
concerns whether a computation can consistently process broad content. But a given
computational process occurs in a particular environment, and throughout that process,
the environment xes unambiguous broad content for the tokens.18 A problematic compu-
tational process described above—containing a mixture of physically identical water and
twater tokens—is not a possibility supported by the arguments for broad content. As far as
broad content is concerned, tokens within a process are either allwater tokens or all twater
tokens depending on the environment in which the process is located. erefore, the
comparison relevant for whether broad content can be consistently processed is between
tokens that could take place in the same environment, not tokens that could take place
anywhere in any environment. Within an environment—and a physical computational
process always occurs in some environment—there is no reason why computations cannot
consistently process broad content. Broad content does not threaten the consistent hand-
ling of representations by computational processes.ere is nothing wrong with saying
that my Twin Earth counterpart possesses an information-processing subsystem that
reliably processes twater tokens, while I possess a reliablewater processor.ere appears
no reason why a computation within an environment cannot process broad content just
as consistently as it could narrow content.
Fodor’s formality condition on computation is:
f1 Any dierence in representational content between computational states should be
mirrored in a dierence in their formal structure.
But a weaker condition suces to make sense of semantic sensitivity:
18. Cases where the computational process is transported between environments during the computation,
or where the environment changes during the computation, can also be handled.ey should be treated
in the same way as cases of individuals transported from Earth to Twin Earth. e thought is that the
individual would continue having Earthly content for some time aer the transportation (certainly enough
time to complete any thoughts), and only gradually acquire Twin Earth content as he or she becomes
embedded in Twin Earth representational relations and conventions (Block 1990). Hence, one should not
expect inconsistent information processing. Similarly, cases in which a process is so large as to span two
environments pose no problem, since the process can be consistent in how it handles broad content within
each part of the process, and this is sucient for consistent individuation.
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f2 For a computational process, P, all dierences in representational content to which
P appears to be sensitive should be mirrored in a formal dierence between P’s
states.
F2 is compatible with the representational content being broad or narrow.
Why does Fodor endorse F1 rather than F2?e comparison class one has in mind when
explaining semantic sensitivity is crucial. If the comparison class includes all possible
physical computational states in any environment, then every aspect of representational
content should supervene on formal structure, and F1 follows. However, as should be
clear, the comparison class is smaller, namely, the class of tokens that could occur in the
computational state’s ‘owner’ process. If the link between computational states and their
owners is ignored, then an incorrect comparison class is introduced. With that connection
in mind however, F1 can be replaced with F2 with no loss to explanations of semantic
sensitivity.
A consequence of F2 is that there are no interesting constraints, stemming from the nature
of computation, on whether computational psychology is individualistic. Contra Fodor
and Egan, computational psychology need not be individualistic.is raises a question:
given that there are no principled constraints stemming from the nature of computation,
are there any constraints from the practice of computational psychology that determine
whether computational psychology is individualistic? Egan (1991) argues that when this
question is asked about psychology as a whole, there is no single correct answer. In some
cases, psychological explanations attribute narrow content, such as Marr’s ascription of
representations of proximal features of subject’s visual eld, e.g. blobs, virtual lines, and
zero-crossings. In other cases, psychological explanations attribute broad content, such as
Marr’s ascription of representations of distal features, for example, surfaces, shadows, and
cracks. On the version of the received view described above, one should expect a similarly
mixed answer to the question of whether computational psychology is individualistic.
ere is no reason why computational psychology should be restricted to narrow content.
3 Arguments for the representation condition
Let us turn to the arguments for R. A computation maps certain inputs to certain outputs.
A physical computation is a mapping between real-world stu : it takes stu (ink-marks,
electrical signals, etc.) as input and yields other stu, or other arrangements of stu, as
output.e claim defended below is that computations are not just mappings between
any kind of stu, but mappings between stu that represents.
Here are three arguments for why computation has to involve representational content.
3.1 Paradigmatic cases of computation involve representation
Many paradigmatic cases of computation involve representation. For example, Turing’s
mindless clerk, who performs computations by hand, performs a mapping between
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representations.19 e clerk maps representations (ink-marks on the page) to other
representations (other ink-marks on the page).e clerk’s ink-marks can be interpreted as
representing either numerals or numbers.is ambiguity is not unusual.e ink-marks,
1, can represent either the numeral ‘1’ or the number 1, depending on context.e context
may be specied by adding quotation marks, but this convention is not always decisive.20
e same physical stumay also have multiple representational contents associated with it,
and consequently the same physical process may have multiple computational identities.
Another paradigmatic case, electronic computation, also involves representation. An
electronic computer takes electrical signals as input and yields electrical signals as output.
e input and output electrical signals of a computer represent. Typically, the electrical
signals of a computer represent 0’s and 1’s. Again, there is room formultiple representation.
A given signal may represent both a long sequence of 0’s and 1’s and the text of a new
e-mail message. Or, a given signal may represent both a sequence of 0’s and 1’s and a
picture to display on the screen. Algorithms manipulate signals that represent. A sorting
algorithm manipulates electrical signals that represent letters or sentences; a compiler
manipulates electrical signals that represent formal states of another machine; a syntax
checker manipulates electrical signals that represent well or ill formed strings of letters.
e fact that paradigmatic cases of computation involve representation is far from con-
clusive as an argument for R, but it is not negligible either. When questions arise as to
whether a case counts as a computation or not, it is salutary to keep the paradigmatic cases
in mind. It is also worth observing the marked lack of paradigmatic cases of computation
without representational content.
3.2 Representation is involved in the notion of I/O equivalence
Our notion of computation involves a notion of input–output (I/O) equivalence. We
sometimes claim that two physical systems are ‘computationally equivalent’ or ‘compute
the same function’. What wemean is that the two systems perform the same computational
task, even if they use dierent computational methods to achieve the same ends. I/O equi-
valence is a necessary, but not a sucient, condition for computational identity.21 I wish
to argue one cannot make sense of I/O equivalence without requiring that computation
involves representational content.
Imagine two I/O equivalent systems that are made out of dierent physical materials.
One system is made out of silicon and takes electrical signals as inputs and outputs, the
other system is made out of tin cans and string and takes marbles as inputs and outputs.
Suppose that the two systems are computationally I/O equivalent. What could their I/O
equivalence consist in?e respective inputs and outputs of the two systems are dierent,
and may be so dierent as to not have any physical or functional properties in common.
19. For a description of why human computers are paradigmatic cases of computation, see Gandy (1988);
Sieg (1994, 2001).
20. at there is an ambiguity about content seems required to make sense of the possibility of a
use/mention confusion. What is at stake in a disagreement about use/mention is whether one is talking
about numerals or numbers when employing the ink-marks.
21. See Sprevak (2007).
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e only answer seems to be that their respective inputs and outputs represent the same
thing.
Consider two computational systems that perform the same numerical calculation. Sup-
pose that one system takes ink-marks shaped like Roman numerals (I, II, III, IV, . . . ) as
input and yields ink-marks shaped like Roman numerals as output. Suppose that the other
system takes ink-marks shaped like Arabic numerals (1, 2, 3, 4, . . . ) as input and yields
ink-marks shaped like Arabic numerals as output. Suppose that the two systems com-
pute the same function, say, the addition function. What could their I/O computational
equivalence consist in? Again, there may be no physical or functional identity between
their respective inputs and outputs.e only way in which their inputs and outputs are
relevantly similar seems to be that their inputs and outputs represent the same thing.
Egan claims that the inputs and outputs of computations can be characterised purely
functionally in a way that does not appeal to representational content:
To describe something as a symbol is to imply that it is semantically inter-
pretable, but (and this is the important point) its type identity as a symbol is
independent of any particular semantic interpretation it might have. Symbols
are just functionally characterized objects whose individuation conditions
are specied by a realization function fR. (Egan 1992, p. 446)
Similarly, Piccinini claims that one can make sense of facts about the I/O equivalence
of computations using functionally characterised symbols and without appeal to their
representational content.22e problem is that there do not seem to be suciently wide-
ranging non-semantic functional characterisations to capture all the relevant facts about
computational equivalence. Given the huge diversity of physical and functional properties
of systems that are computationally equivalent, restricting attention to non-semantic
resources cannot account for the facts.e only thing that two physically diverse inputs
and outputs have in common is that they represent the same thing.
Appeal to representational content also recovers intuitions about I/O equivalence that
those hostile to R claim as uniquely their own. Consider the following case. Two physical
processes that are intrinsic physical duplicatesmay have dierent representational contents
associated with them, and hence dierent computational identities. One physical process
may calculate chess moves, while a physical duplicate of that process calculates stock
market predictions. We seem inclined to say that, in a sense, the two processes compute
dierent functions, yet in another sense they are I/O equivalent. Appeal to representational
content can accommodate both judgements.
e ‘not I/O equivalent’ judgement is straightforwardly entailed by the representational
account above: the two processes are not I/O equivalent because they map dierent
representational content to dierent representational content (chess moves in one case,
stock prices in another). It is less obvious how the account can recover intuitions about the
two physical duplicates being, in a sense, I/O equivalent.is can be done as follows. In
such cases, we are inclined to judge the two processes as I/O equivalent because we easily
interpret the two processes so that they compute the same function. When faced with two
22. Piccinini (2008), pp. 223–224.
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physically (or functionally) identical processes, it is obvious, and highly tempting, to think
of them as possessing a common representational content, such that they both map the
same content to the same content. Such shared representational content can be assigned via
stipulation if need be.e most common way to do this is to interpret the two processes as
involving representations of numbers, which are independent of the environment in which
the process is embedded. It is our disposition to nd shared a representational convention
when faced with physically identical process that is responsible for our judgement that
the processes are computationally equivalent. Notably, what prompts the equivalence
judgement is not, as Piccinini and Egan have it, their physical identity, but that their
physical identity prompts us to assign a common representational content in addition to
whatever other content they may possess.
3.3 Representation is needed to make some basic distinctions
Any plausible notion of computation needs to make certain basic distinctions. Failure
to make these distinctions marks a failure to give an adequate account of computation.
One such basic distinction is between AND gates and OR gates, the building blocks of
many computers. An account of computation that fails to capture this distinction cannot
be adequate or complete as an account of computation.
AND and OR gates have the following characteristics.e output of an AND gate is 1 just
in case both inputs are 1 otherwise it is 0.e output of an OR gate is 0 just in case both
inputs are 0 otherwise it is 1.23
a b a AND b
0 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 1 1
a b a OR b
0 0 0
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 1
Table 1: AND and OR gates
Consider an electrical system with following characteristics.e system gives an output
of 5V if both its inputs are 5V, otherwise it gives an output of 0V. Does this system
implement an AND gate or an OR gate? At rst glance, the system appears to implement
AND: it gives an output of 5 V just in case both its rst and its second inputs are 5 V. But
why should 5V be associated with 1, and 0V with 0, rather than the other way around?
If 5 V is associated with 0, and 0V with 1, then the system implements an OR gate. So
which gate does the system implement? As the system has been described so far, there
is nothing that decides between the two options. No physical, structural, or functional
property decides whether 5 V should be paired with 1, and 0V with 0, or 5 V with 0, and
0V with 1.e situation is symmetrical with respect to both assignments.
23. Nothing hangs on the assumption that AND and OR gates involve mapping truth values or numbers.
One might take AND and OR as mapping digit pairs (uninterpreted symbols), such ‘0’, ‘1’, or ‘$’, ‘#’. AND
and OR gates will have a dierent pattern of mapping these formal symbols to formal symbols as per their
denitions.e same question will arise: what pattern of formal symbol manipulation does the machine
described in Table 2 instantiate?
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in1 in2 out
0V 0V 0V
0V 5V 0V
5V 0V 0V
5V 5V 5V
Table 2: An implementation of an AND gate or an OR gate?
Appeal to representation allows us to decide between these two options. We can say that
if an electrical signal of 5 V represents 1, and if an electrical signal of 0V represents 0,
then the system implements an AND gate. Alternatively, if an electrical signal of 0V
represents 1, and if an electrical signal of 5 V represents 0, then the system implements an
OR gate.e dierence between an implementation of an AND gate and an OR gate is a
dierence in representational content.
Notably, appeal to the larger system in which the unit is embedded does not help to
determine whether a unit is AND or OR. Irrespective of how large or complex the em-
bedding system, or how many of units obeying Table 2 one strings together, it is still
open whether those units instantiate AND or OR. One could adopt a convention where
all such units realise AND gates, or all realise OR gates. One could even consistently
adopt a mixed convention in which some units, say, those on the le part of the machine
implement AND gates, and those on the right part of the machine implement OR. No
physical or structural property of the system decides between the options. It is only our
representational conventions that settle whether a unit following Table 2 is AND or OR.
e temptation to treat a unit satisfying Table 2 as an AND gate derives only from our
habit of favouring representational conventions that assign higher numbers to higher
voltages, and which are invariant under changes in spatial location.
e representational nature of physical computation is sometimes obscured by the widely
accepted claim that computation is syntactic. But computation is syntactic in at least two
senses. First, as we saw in Section 2.3, computation is sensitive to the formal, syntactic,
structure of its input.is requirement is, of course, compatible with the claim that such
input has representational content.e second sense in which computation is syntactic is
that the inputs and outputs of a computation oen represent syntactic entities. We oen
take an input to a computational process to represent a numeral (‘0’ or ‘1’) rather than a
number (0 or 1).us, one oen nds the inputs and outputs of an AND gate labelled with
the numeral ‘0’ or ‘1’, and this called its ‘syntactic content’. Such content may be syntactic,
but it is representational content nevertheless.
Another source of confusion about syntax arises from the conation of the notion of
physical computation with the notion of computation in mathematics. As argued in
Section 2.2, physical computation and computation in mathematical computation theory
are distinct. A Turing machine employs the mathematical notion of computation: it is
an abstract mathematical object that does not ‘perform’ a computation in the same way
as a physical system. A Turing machine, typically identied with a set, is not dissimilar
in ontological status to a mathematical function, such as f (x) = x2. A Turing machine
21
4 Conclusion
operates on numerals instead of numbers. It takes numerals (symbols) as input and yields
numerals (symbols) as output. A Turing machine operates on syntactic entities.24
Two points should be made about these syntactic entities. First, syntactic entities such
as numerals are themselves abstract objects—they are not identical to ink-marks on the
page, although ink-marks may represent them. Second, syntactic entities are commonly
thought of as uninterpreted in this context, that is, as lacking representational content
themselves. Hence, mathematical computation does not need to operate on entities that
represent.is may lead one to conclude that the computations performed by physical
systems do not need to operate on entities that represent either. Unfortunately, this is
not true. Although symbolic entities, such as numerals, provide a way of individuating
Turing machines, these abstract objects are not available in the physical world. In physical
computation, we are stuck with physical stu, such as ink-marks and electrical impulses.
As we have seen, the only way for such stu to support a plausible notion of computational
equivalence is to employ the notion of representation.e non-representational nature
of mathematical computation does not carry over to real-world computation.e two
notions of computation have dierent commitments.
4 Conclusion
What is the dierence between a computation and any other physical process? Under what
conditions are two computations the same or dierent? Partial answers to these questions
are now available. A computation essentially involves the manipulation of representations.
Computations are consistent ways of mapping representational content to representational
content.ere is no restriction on the type of representational content involved: it may
be mathematical, environmental, proximal, distal, broad, narrow, etc. Two physical
systems compute the same function—they are I/O equivalent—just in case they map the
same representational content to the same representational content. I/O equivalence is
a necessary but not a sucient condition for computational identity.ese answers are
partial for two reasons. First, not every process that consistently maps representations to
representations is a computation. A computation should also, in a sense yet to be dened,
bemechanical: there should be a counterfactually robust inter-linked series of steps in
how it achieves its mapping of representational content. Second, two physical systems
perform the same computation just in case they are I/O equivalent and they achieve their
mapping between representational content in the same way. Explicating this latter notion
requires considering whether the inter-linked series of steps are appropriately similar
in the two cases. ere is opportunity here for representational content to enter into
the story again. However, a detailed treatment of this condition is the subject matter of
a full-blown positive account of computation. For the moment, it should be clear that
the representation condition is an essential condition in such an account, and that the
arguments against it canvassed above do not hold up.
24. See Boolos, Burgess and Jerey (2002), pp. 24–25, for more on this point.
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